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Introduction 
 
The analysis of collective bargaining coordination has attracted the attention of scholars 
and policy-makers since the early 1990s, but has witnessed a renaissance more recently in 
the context of generalised de-centralization and the new constraints imposed by the EMU 
(Glassner and Pochet 2011, Soskice and Iversen 2003). Originally, coordination was 
presented as a dimension of collective bargaining considered alternative to centralization, 
as it focused on processes rather than structures. However, the reality was that all 
coordination indexes and scores tended to reflect structural characteristics of collective 
bargaining and provided limited insights on the processes and relational aspects 
underpinning coordination (Traxler and Kittel 2000).    
In this way, most studies have paid attention to the level where coordination occurs, 
assuming a correspondence between formal roles across levels and actors. A strong focus 
on structures has resulted in limited knowledge about the actual mechanisms that industrial 
relations actors deploy to solve coordination problems. Despite growing research on the 
comparative analysis of collective bargaining coordination and its impact, we still lack 
profound knowledge about the mechanisms sustaining coordination; how information 
flows between actors in the collective bargaining structure; or the mechanisms used by 
actors in bargaining processes to reach an agreement.   
The objective of the NETWIR project is to provide an alternative assessment of how 
coordination takes places in different collective bargaining systems and sectors. In order 
to do so, the project adopts a behavioural and relational view based on the 
methodological and analytical tools of Social Network Analysis (SNA). By doing so, it 
provides for the first-time comparative evidence on the relational dimension of 
coordination by exploring collective bargaining networks, thus complementing the 
institutional studies already available1.  
The network as a theoretical framework or as a metaphor has been referred in several 
industrial relations studies (Saundry et al 2011, Fichter and Sydow 2012), but few of them 
have applied the methodology in a rigorous way. Networks have been used first of all in 
relation to actors, and more specifically, trade unions. Building upon the social movement 
literature (Diani 2000), several authors have conceptualized trade unions as networks. Thus, 
Roca (2016) analysed patterns of trade union recruitment and affiliation using this 
                                                
1 This comparative report has relied for the analsysis on Section III on the NETWIR National Country 
Reports elaborated by the partners in the project. The country report for the Netherlands has been 
elaborated by Wike Been and Maarten Keuen (Been and Keune 2020); the country report for Italy 
has been elaborated by Andrea Bottalico, Luigi Burroni and Anna Mori (Burroni, Mori and Bottalico 
2020); the country report for Ireland has been elaborated by Liam Kneafsey and Aidan Regan 
(Regan and Kneafsey 2020); the country report for Spain has been elaborated by Alejandro 
Godino, Joel Martí and Óscar Molina (Molina and Godino 2020). All national reports are available 
at the NETWIR webpage: http://netw-ir.eu/reports/. 
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mechanism in the case of some small unions in Spain. In a similar way, Peetz et al. (2016) 
used this tool in order to study union delegate networks in Australia.   
However, when it comes to analysing the network relations underpinning collective 
bargaining, we find several references to the network idea in transnational or cross-border 
collective bargaining (Gollbach and Schulten 2000, Schulten 2003) but hardly anything 
when it comes collective bargaining at national level. The single most interesting analysis 
for the sake of this project was made by Öberg et al. (2002). These authors used some of 
the tools of SNA in order to understand which actors are the most influential in labour 
market policy, how much trust there is among them as well as the type and degree of 
communication in the network. These authors also explored patterns and mechanisms of 
coordination, paying particular attention to trust and power (Svensson and Öberg 2006). 
But this study constitutes an honourable exception in relation to the application of SNA to 
collective bargaining. Methodological difficulties as well as the dominance of 
institutionalist approaches to collective bargaining analysis are the main explanations for 
the lack of scholarly attention. In this view, collective bargaining would be better depicted 
in terms of a small number of actors who meet regularly and take decisions based on 
routine negotiations and with little scope for non-formalised interactions and coordination.   
The relational view on coordination pays attention to the actual roles and interactions of 
actors, not their formal attributions in the collective bargaining structure. Social network 
methods are particularly well suited for dealing with multiple levels of analysis and multi-
modal data structures, as is the case of collective bargaining systems in most EU countries. 
In particular, two-mode or affiliation networks (Borgatti and Everett 1997) provide a specific 
type of network with two different sets of nodes (individuals and events), and ties existing 
only between nodes belonging to different sets. The inclusion of events is particularly 
relevant in the case of collective bargaining due to their importance in negotiation 
processes. 
The report presents results from a comparative analysis of collective bargaining networks 
in four countries and two sectors and discusses findings and methodological aspects at 
the light of the existing comparative industrial relations theories. In each country, collective 
bargaining networks in the pharmaceutical and retail sectors have been analysed. The 
results suggest an important role for non-formal interactions and forms of coordination in 
bargaining processes in all countries and sectors. These non-formal mechanisms for 
coordination exhibit variance but are particularly important in those sectors / countries with 
more decentralised bargaining structures. Moreover, the analysis of bargaining networks 
has allowed to identify the importance of intra-organizational coordination dynamics in 
order to reach inter-organizational coordination, with trade unions playing a particularly 
important role in decentralized settings. Whilst the national institutional frameworks seem 
to play a relevant role in shaping bargaining networks and interactions, the results also 
point to the existence of sectoral patterns in the forms of coordination.  
The report is structured in four sections. Section I provides the analytical and theoretical 
framework for the implementation of SNA methodologies to collective bargaining. As the 
project had a strong methodological component, Section II provides a detailed account 
Bargaining in Networks: A Comparative Analysis of Coordination in Collective Bargaining 
   
 
5 
 
of the methodology used in the NETWIR project. Section III then moves to the comparative 
analysis of bargaining networks in the four countries and the two sectors analysed; 
pharmaceuticals and retail. Finally, Section IV reflects on the benefits and challenges of 
applying SNA to the Industrial Relations field at the light of project’s results.    
 
 
SECTION I - The application of Social 
Network Analysis to Social Sciences and 
Industrial Relations 
 
As an analytical tool, Social Network Analysis (SNA) has experienced over the last two 
decades a remarkable expansion and application to very diverse disciplines, including 
biology, physics, chemistry, management, psychology, political science, sociology etc 
(Borgatti et al. 2009). Moreover, the network concept has become one of the most 
important buzzwords in social sciences in recent years. The extension of the term to very 
diverse disciplines and its application to very distinct phenomena has nonetheless taken 
many forms. In some cases, the network concept has simply been used as a conceptual 
reference, or as metaphor (Knox et al. 2016). By contrast other works have applied Social 
Network Analysis methodology and tools more thoroughly.  
In the case of social sciences, SNA was traditionally an instrument used by sociologists to 
understand the changing face of societies. This is well illustrated by Granovetter’s weak 
ties theory (Granovetter 1973). Since then, SNA has spread to more areas of sociology, 
anthropology, political science etc. But the two areas of social sciences where SNA has 
received more attention in recent years are social movements in relation to collective 
action (Saunders 2007, Diani 2000) and policy networks (Kenis and Schneider 1991, Rhodes 
2006).  
In the case of social movements, social network analysis was used as a mechanism to 
reach a better understanding of the way social movements work, how collective identities 
are formed, how solidarity is built and information flows between actors involved in the 
network. In this area, the network idea has moved from being a metaphor (collective 
action explained by ties between different individuals or organizations) to one of the social 
science areas where the implementation of SNA has become more insightful (Diani 2002). 
Another field of social sciences where SNA has received considerable attention is public 
policy through the use of policy networks. The primary focus of policy networks research 
has been on the type and consequences of networks. Just as with other disciplines and 
areas of study, the way in which the network concept enters the policy network literature 
is very diverse, being used most often as a metaphor and theory, rather than as an 
analytical tool and empirical approach (Börzel 1998). In the field of international relations, 
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policy networks are used to detect and analyse problems in diffuse organizations and 
international networks. Drew et al. (2011) used two-mode networks to visualize the 
complexity of interactions between individuals and organizations in the specific case of 
environmental protection organizations. Researchers have tended to emphasize variation 
in structure across different groups or contexts, using these differences to explain outcome 
variations (Borgatti et al. 2009: 894).  
Under the general heading of policy networks, several related concepts / approaches 
have developed, but three of them are particularly important / relevant. First, the concept 
of leadership networks has been used to name the type of relations between those 
occupying top positions, including information exchange, capacity to act collectively and 
discourse harmonization (Hoppe and Reinelt 2010, Fransen et al. 2015). Second, the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) has also developed in the field of public policy 
(Sabatier 1988, Ingold 2011). Sabatier defined ACF as those settings characterised by 
multiple actors and levels of government that produces decisions despite high levels of 
uncertainty and ambiguity. Finally, closely related to the policy network concept is the 
idea of network governance (Sørensen and Torfing 2007, Lewis 2011), which is particularly 
important for industrial relations and collective bargaining, and has experienced a 
remarkable growth in recent years.  
According to Sørensen and Torfing (2007:9), governance networks can be defined as “a 
relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent actors; who interact through 
negotiations which take place within a framework that is self-regulating (within limits); and 
which contributes to the production of public purpose”. By contrast, policy network can 
be defined as a social structure, comprising actors who interact in political processes 
across different levels rather than in what was formerly hierarchical policymaking 
(Coleman and Perl, 1999). Even though there is some degree of overlap between policy 
networks and network governance, a consensus seems to emerge on policy networks as 
key elements in network governance. In short, network governance rests on a recognition 
that policy is the result of governing processes that are not fully controlled by governments 
(network as a form of governance) (Lewis 2011: 1222) whilst policy networks refer to the 
idea of interest intermediation within these those governance networks. The insights 
provided by the literature on policy networks and governance networks are particularly 
useful for the analysis of collective bargaining networks provided the similarities in the 
object of research.   
 
Understanding Collective Bargaining Coordination: a Relational 
Approach 
 
Coordination of collective bargaining, and in particular, wage-setting coordination is 
considered a critical variable in order to understand how collective bargaining systems 
work and what is their impact on economic outcomes. This is particularly the case in the 
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context of the EMU as governments do no longer have the exchange rate as a policy 
instrument (Calmfors 1998, Hancké and Soskice 2003).  
Centralization indexes became the standard benchmark to assess the impact of collective 
bargaining on economic performance in the 1980s under the neo-corporatist literature 
and the Calmfors and Driffill (1988) hump-shaped hypothesis. Only in the late 1980s-early 
1990s, under the nascent literature on capitalist models and the unleashing of de-
centralizing mechanisms, did coordination start to be proposed as an alternative 
dimension to centralization. Scale measures of coordination were made by Soskice (1990) 
and Hall and Franzese (1998), with the objective of providing a more accurate measure 
and replacing centralization indexes. However, it soon became clear that one-
dimensional scale measurement of coordination presented more challenges than in the 
case of centralization. Kenworthy (2001) suggested a categorical score that tried to 
capture the diversity of mechanisms sustaining coordination of collective bargaining 
across countries whilst allowing to rank countries.  
In the ICTWSS, J.Visser built upon the coordination score of Kenworthy, but introduced two 
complementary variables. First, he coded into two separate variables the degree and the 
type of wage coordination. The degree of coordination followed the score by Kenworthy 
whilst the type of coordination was based on Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel (2001). The 2015 
version of the database introduced another related variable, i.e., the articulation of 
enterprise bargaining that captures the extent to which enterprise bargaining develops 
autonomously from multi-employer collective bargaining. 
Notwithstanding the increase in number and quality of collective bargaining coordination 
measures, they nonetheless suffer from similar problems. In particular, the way in which 
coordination has been assessed and measured reproduces some of the shortcomings of 
previous indexes of collective bargaining centralization, as their focus remains pretty much 
structural. Adopting a structural / institutional perspective on coordination, misses the 
behavioural and relational dimension that is key to understand how actors coordinate in 
the bargaining system. In defining its path-setting coordination measure, Kenworthy (2001: 
1) acknowledged this critical problem:  
“Wage coordination is a behavioural concept. It refers to the degree of 
intentional harmonization in the wage setting process or, put another way, 
the degree to which "minor players" deliberately follow along with what the 
"major players" decide. In my view, measurement problems associated with 
trying to capture the actual degree to which various actors involved in the 
wage setting process deliberately harmonize their bargaining are severe. To 
do so in an accurate fashion, the researcher must factor in both the share of 
the work force whose wages are deliberately pegged to the agreement(s) 
reached by the major players and the degree to which minor players 
intentionally follow along (i.e., do they adhere more closely or less?). 
Obtaining the relevant information and deciding how to rank countries in a 
relatively objective fashion is likely to be extremely difficult”. 
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Its coordination measure, similarly to the one contained in the ICTWSS Database is 
accordingly not based on relations or behaviour, but “on the structural characteristics of 
the wage bargaining process. The scores represent a set of expectations about which 
institutional features of wage setting arrangements are likely to generate a greater degree 
of coordination. They represent a hypothesis or a prediction, rather than a measure per 
se” (Kenworthy 2001: 1). 
In this passage, Kenworthy pointed out to two key elements. First, a different power-based 
approach to coordination, based on the interaction between weak and strong players. 
How strong players manage to align the interests of the weak ones is at the end of the day 
what coordination is about in any collective bargaining context. Adopting this approach, 
ranking countries would be extremely difficult and only a typology of different forms of 
coordination could be developed. Secondly, he already suggested the empirical 
challenges to implement such a strategy as it implies going beyond traditional methods 
and approaches. 
The object of this project is to provide an alternative assessment of how coordination takes 
places in different collective bargaining systems and sectors and whether this explains 
observed differences in outcomes. In order to do so, the project adopts a behavioural and 
relational view on it. By doing so, it provides complementary evidence on collective 
bargaining coordination to the one already available. 
 
Table 1. The structural and relational approaches towards collective bargaining 
coordination 
Structural Relational 
Based on formal attributions of actors Based on real interactions and relations  
Roles and responsibilities Information flows 
 
The relational view on coordination pays attention to the actual roles and interactions of 
actors, not their formal attributions in the collective bargaining structure. In this vein, the 
relational approach towards collective bargaining coordination focuses on the analysis of 
interactions / connections between different actors at different levels and through 
different instances that allow to coordinate collective bargaining processes and 
outcomes.  
 
The vertical and horizontal dimensions of collective bargaining 
coordination 
 
The analysis of collective bargaining coordination, including most indexes and scores, 
have tended to focus on its vertical dimension, i.e., on the relationship between actors at 
different levels in the collective bargaining structure. However, collective bargaining 
Bargaining in Networks: A Comparative Analysis of Coordination in Collective Bargaining 
   
 
9 
 
coordination has also a strong horizontal dimension. By horizontal coordination we mean 
coordination between collective bargaining units in similar levels. This form of coordination 
can take several forms, being pattern bargaining the most frequent. Pattern bargaining 
defines a situation where a certain firm or industry set the pattern for sequential 
negotiations in other firms or sectors (Traxler et al. 2008, Marshall and Merlo 2004). This 
coordination can take place for instance between companies (intra-industry pattern 
bargaining), sectors (inter-industry pattern bargaining) or even regions. The most well-
known example of horizontal coordination is the pattern-bargaining system in Germany 
(with the role of the Metalworkers collective agreement) and Japan (with the Spring 
offensive). More recently, spillover effects both between sectors in one country, but also 
between countries, have also been measured (Lehr et al. 2018). 
 
 
SECTION II – Empirical Strategy: How to use 
SNA for the study of collective bargaining 
coordination 
 
Social Network Analysis and Collective Bargaining Coordination: 
Some Hypothesis for Empirical Analysis 
 
In order to explore the coordination of collective bargaining from a relational point of view, 
the NETWIR project has applied the methodology and analytical tools of social network 
analysis. Social network analysis comprises theories and methods of investigating structural 
relations among social actors and explaining social outcomes as the result of connections 
at the individual, subgroup, and complete network levels of analysis (Knoke 2011).  
Social Network analysis allows processing, analysing and visualizing relations between 
different actors (individuals or organisations) and patterns of connections within their 
populations. The micro-level foundations of social networks are concerned with people 
choosing to interact with one another in various ways. Such small-scale decisions 
aggregate to more meso-level social structures that can hinder or facilitate collective 
action by groups and organizations, such as coordination in collective bargaining. 
In spite of its powerful analytical tools, it has seldom been applied to the study of industrial 
relations and more specifically collective bargaining coordination. The only study that has 
applied this methodology has been Svensson and Öberg (2005). In their work, these 
authors try to understand how coordination really works in one of the countries that 
systematically ranks high in coordination indexes and scores, i.e., Sweden. In particular, 
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through the use of social network methodology, they study whether coordination results 
from trust relations between actors or rather it relies on power and hierarchy.  
The application of Social Network Analysis to the study of collective bargaining can bring 
several benefits to achieve a better understanding of industrial relations systems whilst 
providing new insights into the existing theories. First, it can help to understand which is the 
role of power, trust or hierarchies in sustaining collective bargaining coordination. Social 
network analysis not only provides useful descriptive information about the shape of 
collective bargaining networks (including density measures, centrality etc.), but most 
importantly for the sake of this project, analytical indicators related to the (power) position 
of an actor in the network. Second, it sheds additional light into the actors, levels and 
institutions that are critical for coordinating collective bargaining in different industrial 
relations systems. Third, it allows to observe how information flows between different actors 
and across levels in the collective bargaining system.  
Several hypotheses can be formulated in relation to the characteristics and implications 
of bargaining networks and interactions within them for coordination in the sectors and 
countries analysed.  
First, in those countries with more de-centralised and voluntarist industrial relations systems, 
we can expect informality and non-formalised interactions in the bargaining network to 
play a more important role in coordinating actors’ behaviour. Despite the limited attention 
paid in industrial relations research to the issue of informality, some studies have explored 
the implications it has. Thus Regalia (1995) and Brown (1993) already pointed out to the 
problems brought by the informality characterising workplace representation in the Italian 
and UK industrial relations systems respectively.  
Moreover, in those sectors and countries where a long-term record of cooperation already 
exists in collective bargaining, formal mechanisms might become less important and 
informal relations among network members’ play a key role in bargaining processes. 
Similarly, it can be argued that formal mechanisms would provide guarantees to actors 
who are involved in processes where there are no previous cooperation experiences and 
trust among actors is limited. 
Secondly, the role of inter and intra-organizational coordination or bargaining. In their 
seminal piece, Walton and McKersie (1965) distinguish four subprocesses in labour 
negotiations; distributive or zero-sum bargaining; integrative or positive-sum bargaining, 
attitudinal structuring and intra-organizational bargaining. Whilst the first three have to do 
with relations between unions and employer (inter-organizational bargaining), the last one 
takes place within the parties involved in negotiations and is aimed at reaching internal 
consensus and bringing a common position to collective bargaining. Therefore, in those 
bargaining contexts where there is a high fragmentation of interest representation on the 
trade union or employer side, we can expect a more crucial role for intra-organizational 
bargaining and coordination.  
The analysis of bargaining networks also allows to study the degree of concentration or 
diffusion of power in the bargaining network. More specifically, in those contexts 
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characterised by low levels of fragmentation of social partners, we can expect power to 
be more concentrated.  At the same time, we can expect more concentration in those 
bargaining contexts characterised by a stronger institutionalisation of processes 
compared to less formalised settings.  
Social network analysis allows to compare power concentration across bargaining 
networks through synthetic indicators.  One such indicator approaching us to the idea of 
power in networks is centrality. The number of direct ties an actor holds with others in the 
network—technically, the degree centrality—is one of the most basic and intuitive ways to 
measure power. However, depending on the nature of the ties, and on the type of impact 
or output the actors are seeking, other types of less intuitive centralities may be more 
relevant (Freeman 1979, Borgatti, Everett and Johnson 2018). For instance, in an influential 
paper, Bonacich (1987) suggests that, in bargaining situations, power comes from being 
connected to those who are powerless, as being connected to powerful others who have 
many potential trading partners reduces one’s bargaining power. Hence, the power of an 
actor may be tied to the many direct ties of that actor as well as to the little ties of its direct 
contacts.  
Other centrality indicators take into consideration whether an actor’s direct contacts 
(alters) are (or are not) connected to each other. For instance, a distinction is made 
between the case in which an actor is positioned in a network where its alters are all 
densely connected to each other, and the case in which an actor sits on a structural hole, 
with all or most of its alters being unconnected to each other. These two positions convey 
different types of advantages. High closeness is normally considered a precondition for the 
emergence of trustful relations—an important governance mechanism, since it reduces 
both uncertainty and information asymmetries in the interactions between two actors 
(Coleman 1988). Also, close ties typically allow the exchange of more fine-grained 
information, which is more proprietary and tacit than the information exchanged in open 
networks; therefore, close ties also entail effective joint problem-solving arrangements that 
speed up responses to the market (Giuliani and Pietrobelli 2011: 9). 
The central assumption underlying the focus on networks and network relations is that these 
relations and the interdependencies that come with them matter for the explanation of 
individual or collective behaviour. The cases (nodes) can be as diverse as individuals, 
organisations, etc. The links (ties) between the nodes can represent various kinds of 
relationships, such as collaboration, information exchange, consultation etc. 
 
Methodology: Mixed Methods and the use of Two-Mode Networks to 
analyse collective bargaining coordination 
 
Two major methodological flaws are common in works applying SNA, including those in 
industrial relations: a weak methodology guiding data collection and the lack of a mixed 
methodology that could enhance the explanatory power of network analysis.  
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In relation to the first problem, what we observe in most cases is that existing relational data 
was collected without a well-defined and rigorous strategy. Then SNA tools were used but 
lacking an articulation between the survey (method and questions included), the 
hypothesis to be tested and the type of network used (Svensson and Öberg 2005). A weak 
methodological operationalization explains the mostly descriptive and exploratory use of 
social network tools. However, when its application is made following a clear 
methodology, SNA generates highly valuable quantitative network indicators that may 
significantly contribute to explain outcomes. The objective of this project is precisely to 
advance in the application of SNA in order to explore collective bargaining coordination 
and its (different) outcomes across countries. 
The second problem is related to the lack of mixed methodologies. Even though SNA can 
provide insightful relational evidence on collective bargaining coordination, it requires 
complementing it with other methods / evidence. It is accordingly important to 
acknowledge the limitations of network analysis, particularly when it comes to causality. 
Even though the analysis provides a very detailed description of the way coordination 
works (intensity + quantity of relations, central actors and their power, type of relations), 
two elements contribute to enhance the analytical capacity of SNA-based evidence: 
- First, the comparative approach (countries + sectors) allows to provide 
analytical insights into the implications / outcomes of these coordination 
mechanisms. 
- Secondly, in-depth semi-structured interviews have also been used in order 
to complement and help interpret SNA. 
 
Two-Mode Networks: Contact Networks and Co-Attendance Networks 
 
Social network methods are particularly well suited for dealing with multiple levels of 
analysis and multi-modal data structures, as is the case of collective bargaining systems in 
most EU countries. The analysis of collective bargaining coordination in two sectors and 
four countries has accordingly be made using two-mode networks. Two mode-networks 
(also known as affiliation networks) are those where their nodes may be separated into 
two classes, the links being between nodes of different classes only (Latapy et al. 2008: 31). 
In particular, two-mode networks provide a specific type of network where actors are 
embedded in (primary) contact networks and (secondary) event or co-attendance 
networks. Compared to one-mode networks, two-mode networks introduce the duality 
between persons and groups or events. In the case of collective bargaining, we can think 
of individual persons (a trade union or employer organization official) forming one mode 
and the interactions through events forming another mode.  
The NETWIR project focuses on coordination in relation to specific events like formal / 
informal meetings, the signature of a collective agreement / wage agreement etc. Those 
coordination events also form nodes in the co-attendance network. We accordingly 
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adopt a different meaning of CB coordination in relation to the standard IR definition. In 
those countries where collective agreements at sectoral level are rare, the teams have 
detected other coordination events / mechanisms (as functional equivalents of collective 
agreements) at play that allow to build the network.  
The adoption of this narrower approach to coordination is based on methodological 
considerations, and in particular, to the need to be able to trace back the whole network 
of actors involved in coordination. 
Social network analysis has been implemented in two sectors in each country. The sectors 
have been selected taking into consideration the diversity in institutional contexts and 
constraints that may explain differences in degrees and forms of coordination. Two 
variables have been considered when selecting the sectors. First, the degree of exposure 
to international competition, or in other words, its predominance in exports in a given 
country; this sector is expected to exhibit a high degree of coordination. Secondly, the 
predominant skill level of the workforce in that sector. An agreement was reached around 
the study of the pharmaceuticals sector as a high-skilled and exposed sector. A weaker 
agreement seemed to emerge around retail as a low-skilled and non-exposed sector.  
In order to enhance the theoretical implications deriving from the project, the two sectors 
analysed have been the same in all four countries. This allows to test the influence of the 
industrial relations system as well as other institutional variables on the forms of 
coordination, etc. Moreover, it also allows testing the influence of country size on 
coordination patterns. 
 
The implementation of SNA Methodology in the NETWIR Project 
 
In order to implement SNA tools to the analysis of collective bargaining coordination, the 
following steps have been followed: 
 
Sampling 
 
As we are using two-mode networks, sampling has consisted not only of actors, but also 
events. 
The project’s population includes all the actors involved in collective bargaining 
coordination in the two sectors selected and across the different levels considered. In order 
to do so, the partners have built a census of actors and events in the preparatory phase 
of the project. Semi-structured interviews with key actors have played a key role in 
elaborating the census of actors and events finally included in the study. 
The period we are considering in the analysis are 4-5 years. In other words, we have tried 
to reconstruct the network in this period. This means we have tried to trace back the 
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coordination events taking place in this period, but also the actors that have been 
involved.  
 
Modes and Level of Analysis 
 
We adopt a two-mode research analysis strategy, considering actors / persons and events 
as the two modes. Regarding the level of analysis, the NETWIR project has considered all 
the levels involved in collective bargaining in the two sectors selected for analysis. 
Incidence or affiliation data is particularly important in many social network analyses 
because it is "multi-level."  Actors may be tied together because they are present in the 
same category (that is, they are in the same "incident" to, or are "affiliated" with the same 
structure).  But such data also show how "incidents" are tied together by the "co-presence" 
of actors.  Incidence data involving two kinds of actors (bi-partite) data are very important 
in network analysis because they are often our best window into questions of "agency and 
structure" or "macro-micro linkages." 
 
Survey design2 
 
All partners have been in the initial discussions about the questions to be included in the 
survey in the different project meetings held. The survey has also been discussed with all 
members of the research team in the preparatory and early implementation phases. The 
survey has included several questions aimed at understanding the role of the actor in 
relation to collective bargaining, considering the whole network. For this reason, the survey  
included several types of questions: 
- Binary (0 / 1) in order to understand the existence of links with other actors in 
the network 
- Multiple-category nominal measures of relations in order to assess the type 
of relations with other actors 
- Grouped ordinal measures of relations in order to grasp information about 
the intensity and strength of ties between actors in the network 
- Full-rank ordinal measures of relations in order to score the strength of all of 
the relations of an actor in a rank order from strongest to weakest 
As the implementation of the survey has been online in a first stage, and then through 
telephone interviews in a second stage, it did not contain open questions in order to avoid 
any bias introduced by the survey technique. 
The questions included in the survey have focused on the following aspects: 
                                                
2 Survey form available at: https://ddd.uab.cat/record/233126 
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- The influence or power of different actors in the network 
- The need to coordinate with other actors in the network before negotiations 
around collective agreements 
- The actual use of information provided by other actors in the collective 
bargaining network 
- The quality of information provided by other actors in the collective 
bargaining network 
- The intensity of relations between actors in the collective bargaining network. 
 
Survey implementation 
 
The implementation of the NETWIR survey has been made following a two-step procedure: 
- In a first step, an online version of the questionnaire has been distributed 
among the actors identified. The online questionnaire has been made 
available through an online survey platform, and has been the same for all 
countries / sectors. In order to guarantee a high and satisfactory response 
rate, a follow up was made, including periodical reminders to those not 
having answered the questionnaire 
- In a second step, and depending on the response rate, telephone interviews 
to those actors that have not answered online to the survey have been 
carried out.  
Relational data are collected by asking actors about their relationships with other actors, 
which they have to identify and name. It differs from other approaches, as it deliberately 
asks about relationships between identifiable actors, and not between the respondent 
and general categories or groups of actors—suppliers, clients, universities, etc. This clearly 
makes confidentiality agreements with the respondents of critical importance, as some 
interviewees may be unwilling to provide relational information that involves other actors. 
The survey was translated to the national language in each country and then distributed 
online among the actors in the network. After three rounds of email reminders to actors, 
telephone calls were also used in order to increase the response rate. 
 
Data Processing (Matrices) and Visualization 
 
Data obtained through the survey has been first of all processed using spreadsheets 
following the same template provided by the coordinator. Once the matrix has been built 
on the spreadsheet, it has been exported to a specific SNA software for the analysis and 
visualization. More specifically, partners in the NETWIR project have used VISONE (free 
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licence software for the analysis of social networks, 
https://visone.info/html/download.html) and UCINET. 
The use of sociograms based on data matrices helps to provide a more compact and 
systematic view of network data. Moreover, sociograms are very effective tools in order to 
detect variations in the attributes of networks across sectors and / or countries. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
Two types of variables have been used when analysing data in order to find common 
patterns and explain variation: 
- First, individual-level variables have been explored in order to understand 
what the most influential actors are, how connected they are and how 
coordination mechanisms flow from one actor to another. 
- Second, structural variables have also been analysed in order to identify 
differences between sectors and / or countries. More specifically, structure-
level variables provide information about cross-country and cross-sectoral 
differences in the density of relations / link in collective bargaining, reprocity 
etc. 
 
General Survey Results 
 
One of the main challenges facing the implementation of SNA is to achieve a high 
response rate to the survey. There are different approaches to assessing the response rate. 
The standard way of computing the global response rate to the survey is to divide the 
number of valid respondents by the initial population (i.e., actors in survey questions, 
identified in the qualitative exploratory stage). From an initial population of 187 people, 
the final sample of respondents is n=112 (59,9%).  However, by countries & sectors, response 
rates vary between 8% and 90%, with a median of 63% (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Exploratory network and survey respondents in the four countries. 
Country Sector Exploratory 
network size 
Survey 
respondents 
Survey response 
rate 
Ireland Pharma 10 9 90% 
Retail 13 1 8% 
Italy Pharma 16 10 63% 
Retail 15 12 80% 
Netherlands Pharma (Firm 1) 15 12 80% 
Pharma (Firm 2) 20 17 85% 
Retail 23 13 57% 
Spain Pharma 50 28 56% 
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Retail 25 10 40% 
Total 187 112 60% 
Source: NETWIR survey 
As the network size was delimited ex ante relying on qualitative / exploratory interviews, a 
better measure of the real network size has been computed using a standard criteria for 
all countries. In this way, the final network boundaries have been delimited considering 
network members only those actors with a perceived influence on wage-setting higher 
than 1.5 (median value from a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 5 in a Likert scale). Thus, 
the final network size is the total number of actors with a perceived influence >1.5.  
Applying this criterion and considering the final respondents to network questions in the 
survey, eight networks have been identified, with a median of 11 people (min=5 and 
max=23). The median response rate is 65% (with four networks above 70%). Although these 
response rates are not optimal and below the initial target, they are higher when 
considering only the most relevant actors (those with a perceived influence of 4 or more 
in a Likert's scale ranged from 1 to 5); in this case, the median response rate is 77% (with 
five networks above 70%) (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Network response rates (depending on network boundaries threshold). 
Country Sector Post-fieldwork 
network size 
(median influence 
> 1,5) 
Survey 
respondents 
(median 
influence > 1,5) 
Survey 
respondents 
(median 
influence > 1,5) 
Ireland Pharma 6 6 100% 
Retail 0 0 0% 
Italy Pharma 16 5 31% 
Retail 14 11 79% 
Netherlands Pharma 1 14 10 71% 
Pharma 2 19 15 79% 
Retail 22 13 59% 
Spain Pharma 50 23 46% 
Retail 20 9 45% 
Total 161 92 65% 
Source: NETWIR survey 
In this sample of respondents, there is an overrepresentation of the pharma sector, that in 
all countries has been the sector with the highest response rate, except in Italy. Moreover, 
there are more trade unionists than employers on the networks, something that we already 
anticipated due to the higher reluctance of employers to disclose information about 
bargaining processes and actors. Finally, except in the Spanish case, women are under-
represented in the bargaining network (Table 4). 
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Table 4. Descriptive information of the Survey respondents. 
  Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain Total 
Sector Pharma 9 10 29 28 76 
Retail 1 12 13 10 36 
Side Employer 2 11 14 19 46 
Union 8 11 27 19 65 
Other 0 0 1 0 1 
Mail 
Role 
Political 1 12 25 24 62 
Technical 9 10 2 13 34 
Union 
member 
0 0 15 0 15 
Sex Female 2 4 12 12 30 
Male 8 18 30 26 82 
Total 10 22 42 38 112 
Source: NETWIR survey 
 
In the sectoral analysis of bargaining networks, the network size refers to the total number 
of actors who have answered to the survey and have provided information. In some cases, 
actors responding to the survey have not answered all questions and we lack information 
about particular aspects (contacts, events attended etc.). When this is the case, we have 
omitted those actors and the network size may differ from the number of survey 
respondents. 
 
 
Section III – A Comparative Analysis of Collective 
Bargaining Networks and Coordination  
 
Before entering the analysis of collective bargaining networks in the two sectors and the 
four countries, it is important to consider the institutional context where coordination takes 
place. The form, level and degree of wage setting and collective bargaining coordination 
of the four countries analysed varies greatly3. A first important variable to consider is the 
degree of institutionalization. Among the countries compared, Spain stands out as a 
                                                
3 Section III of this report has relied for its contextual part on the analysis contained in the NETWIR 
National Country Reports elaborated by the partners in the project. The country report for the 
Netherlands has been elaborated by Wike Been and Maarten Keuen (Been and Keune 2020); the 
country report for Italy has been elaborated by Andrea Bottalico, Luigi Burroni and Anna Mori 
(Burroni, Mori and Bottalico 2020); the country report for Ireland has been elaborated by Liam 
Kneafsey and Aidan Regan (Regan and Kneafsey 2020); the country report for Spain has been 
elaborated by Alejandro Godino, Joel Martí and Óscar Molina (Molina and Godino 2020). All 
national reports are available at the NETWIR webpage: http://netw-ir.eu/reports/. 
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heavily regulated collective bargaining system, where statutory regulations define 
important aspects like the actors allowed to negotiate, the bargaining process, contents 
of collective agreements, conflict resolution procedures, extension of collective 
agreements, etc. At the other end of the spectrum, Ireland is a voluntarist industrial 
relations system with a minimum role for the state and virtually no statutory regulation of 
collective bargaining. In between, Italy would stand closer to the voluntarist model, though 
being an institutionally strong collective bargaining system whilst in the case of the 
Netherlands, there is stronger state support to collective bargaining.  
In principle, we could expect a more important role for non-formalised interactions among 
actors involved in bargaining processes in those countries closer to voluntarist principles, 
as actors themselves define the rules, and as consequence the boundaries between 
formality and informality are blurred. However, this does not necessarily mean informality 
will play a less important role in heavily regulated IR systems. As a matter of fact, in these 
systems, informal relations may constitute an important resource in the hands of actors 
involved in the bargaining process to reach an agreement.  
The structure of collective bargaining is another important dimension shaping the 
collective bargaining network. Again, the four cases included in the analysis represent 
different realities of collective bargaining structures. The predominant level of collective 
bargaining in Ireland since 2009 is company-level with a highly decentralised, local firm-
level structure. In Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, multi-employer bargaining 
predominates, though with different roles for company level agreements within the 
bargaining system. In Italy, the bargaining system is based on a two-tier structure: national 
collective agreements (NCAs hereinafter) are negotiated at the sectoral level by national 
trade unions and employers’ associations and are applied to all employees of the specific 
economic sector. This is then complemented with company level agreements. In the 
Netherlands, collective bargaining takes place mainly at the sector level and to a minor 
extent at the company level. In addition, an important share of the sector agreements is 
extended to the companies not part to the agreement by the Ministry of Employment and 
Social Affairs. Finally, in the case of Spain, sectoral collective bargaining predominates but 
with many companies also developing their own collective agreements. In this regard, we 
raise the hypothesis that networks in more centralized coordination systems tend to be 
denser and narrower compared to high-decentralised systems. 
Mechanisms sustaining wage-setting coordination in the four countries are even more 
diverse than collective bargaining dimensions discussed previously. In the case of Spain, 
there is a centralized mechanism for cross-sectoral coordination through peak cross-
sectoral agreements that set guidelines for wage increases in all sectors of the economy, 
including the public sector. In Italy, there is no cross-sectoral wage-setting coordination 
mechanism. In each sector, NCAs set the general conditions, including sectoral minimum 
wages, then complemented with company level bargaining. In the Netherlands the main 
locus for wage setting is also the sector, but some coordination of collective bargaining 
takes place at cross-sectoral level through the bi-partite Labour Foundation where workers 
and employers discuss about the labour market and labour relations, exchange 
information and communicate points of view to the government and to their own 
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members. Finally, there is little or no formal coordination in collective bargaining in Ireland 
since the economic crisis. However, a pattern has emerged in which a loose informal 
coordination has followed from strategic targeting and pattern-setting in sectors where 
unions have greater relative strength.  
 
Pharmaceutical industry 
 
The Pharmaceutical industry is a strategic sector for all countries considering its impact on 
public health and other manufacturing and service sectors, an importance that has 
increased in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The intensive research and scientific 
activity in this sector have its global epicentre in Europe (together with the US). In this 
regard, Germany is the first European Union member state exporter, followed by Belgium 
and Ireland. The four countries studied in the NETWIR project are within the 10 main exporter 
at EU level: Ireland (3rd), Netherlands (4th), Italy (6th) and Spain (8th) (Table 5), not 
including United Kingdom (third at European level with 30.318 € millions of exports). 
 
Table 5. Largest pharmaceutical export EU countries (€ Million). 
 € Million 
Germany 69.513 
Belgium 40.723 
Ireland 30.169 
Netherlands 28.495 
France 28.271 
Italy 20.524 
Denmark 12.301 
Spain 10.497 
Austria 8.405 
Sweden 7.308 
Source: Eurostat (COMEXT database 2018) 
 
Employment in the pharmaceutical sector in the EU was 219.000 employees in 2016, 0,34% 
of the total employment. The employment significance of the pharma sector is particularly 
important in Ireland where the 26.000 workers of the pharma sector represent 1,19% of its 
labour market. The sector is one of the main drivers of the Irish economy and employment, 
with all ten largest multinationals of the sector operating in the country. The pharma 
industry is also relevant in the other NETWIR countries, though not to the extent of the Irish 
case (Graph 1). Even though, these countries count with many indirect jobs in the sector 
(i.e. Spain with 160 thousand indirect jobs (Farmaindustria 2018)). 
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Graph 1. Share of pharmaceutical industry workers in NETWIR countries and the EU. 
 
Source: EFPIA member associations; INE active labour survey (2019), Central Bank of Ireland, (2019) and Statline 
(2019). 
 
Overall, the pharmaceutical sector workforce is highly skilled (more than 90% of higher 
education workers in Italy, 65% in Ireland and 62% in Spain, always higher than national 
average). Working and employment conditions are better than average for the economy 
(higher salaries, higher rates of permanent and full-time contracts, etc.). The participation 
of women is diverse across counties: while Spanish pharmaceutical industry has 52% of 
women workers (higher than in others industrial activities), Dutch participation of women 
in pharma is 40%. 
 
Collective Bargaining Networks in the Pharma Industry 
 
Notwithstanding being a small sector from the point of view of total employment, 
collective bargaining in the pharma sector plays a key role for bargaining processes in 
other sectors in all the countries analysed. Industrial relations in the pharmaceutical industry 
are characterised in most cases by being largely cooperative thanks to the predominance 
of large companies, good working conditions and high productivity levels in the sector. 
However, these cooperative relations occur in different institutional contexts where social 
partners have diverse resources and capacities. The analysis of bargaining networks in the 
Pharmaceutical sector reveals two clearly differentiated patterns in the four countries 
analysed.  
In the case of Ireland and the Netherlands, collective bargaining in the Pharma sector 
takes place at company level. In the two countries, there is a strong transnational 
dimension, as the mother multinational company plays a key role in setting wages or at 
least, setting a target for pay increases. Even though the two countries lack a sectoral level 
1,19%
0,29%
0,19%
0,23%
0,34%
Ireland (2018)
Italy (2016)
Netherlands (2017)
Spain (2017)
EU (2016)
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of coordination, they have nonetheless developed alternative mechanisms for 
coordination that are functional alternatives to an explicit sector-wide form of 
coordination. 
In the case of Ireland, the analysis reveals three elements underpinning wage coordination 
in the sector. First, pay norms in the German chemicals industry and broader German 
economy as key to the goal-setting. Second, a key role for trade unions, and in particular 
SIPTU, in spreading the 2% pay norm between companies through a tight network of 
individuals (Regan and Kneafsey 2020). Finally, the analysis of the pharma sector for the 
Irish case also highlights the importance of informal links and personal relationships 
between union officials, HR managers in major ‘pattern-setting’ firms, and employer 
representative bodies and/or consultancies in the development and implementation of a 
strategy broadly characterised as ‘pattern bargaining’. 
In the Dutch case, the transnational dimension also emerges as central to collective 
bargaining dynamics as the bargaining process is conditioned one way or the other by 
the mother company, therefore leaving limited room for the Dutch daughter company. 
However, contrary to the case of Ireland, fragmentation on the trade union side has been 
pointed out as an obstacle for coordination. As a matter of fact, the employer organization 
AWVN seems to play a coordination role in supporting companies through information 
provision or being involved in negotiation rounds (Been and Keune 2020).  
In Italy and Spain, collective bargaining in the Pharma sector is based on sectoral 
coordination processes of the chemical-pharmaceutical activities and characterised by 
cooperative relations between unions and employers. Moreover, in the two countries the 
chemical-pharmaceutical collective agreement constitutes a reference for other sectors 
due to its innovative character. 
 
Table 6. Characteristics of pharma survey respondents. 
 Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain 
Side Employer 2 4 11 18 
Union 7 6 18 10 
Main role 
during 
bargaining 
Political 0 5 18 15 
Technical 9 5 1 12 
Union member 0 0 10 0 
Sex Female 2 1 8 9 
Male 7 9 21 19 
Source: NETWIR survey 
Whilst sectoral characteristics certainly contribute to maintain consensus and cooperation 
between unions and employers, there are other mechanisms supporting cooperative 
relations. In the case of Italy, a relatively small network made up of 16 actors belonging to 
three largest trade union confederations and the two employer organisations (10 out of 
these 16 responding to the survey) (Table 6), facilitate intra and inter-organizational 
coordination. Moreover, the bargaining network is rather stable, as actors have been 
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involved in collective bargaining in the sector for many years, therefore contributing to 
high level of trust.  
The bargaining network in the Spanish case is larger compared to the Italian one, with 
almost 50 actors involved (28 responding to the survey) and similarly to the Italian case, 
most actors have a longstanding relation in collective bargaining in the sector. The analysis 
in Spain has revealed a more important role for informal interactions during the bargaining 
process. As a matter of fact, informal multilateral events are considered the most relevant 
form of interaction after the formal multilateral ones in the case of Pharma in Spain. 
Particularly important are intra-organizational informal events in the case of employers, 
that serve to discuss main issues previous bargaining negotiations. That is the case of the 
so-called “days of coexistence” in which members of the FEIQUE team, sub-sectoral, 
professional and/or territorial partner associations hold informal a pre-negotiation event for 
days. But there are also informal events gathering unions and employers during the 
negotiation final stage to solve the final obstacles for signing a collective agreement. Both 
employers and unions attach a key role to the so-called “Reduced Commission” in the 
final phase of the negotiation (prior to the drafting commission) in which two or three 
members of each organization hold two or three meetings to unblock certain aspects of 
the negotiation. The relevance of this event lies in its formal call while its development is 
informal (that is, official but without minutes). Members of the commission are required to 
negotiate without previous positions of the organizations, developing the meetings in an 
open, without conflict and in trust environment, all with a single goal: to find solutions to 
the demands of each organization. In other words, the negotiation process uses informal 
mechanisms in a formal event for the success of the negotiation. 
In the countries with more decentralized bargaining systems in Pharma, lack of trust is a 
major issue when it comes to the problems to achieve coordination of collective 
bargaining (Ireland and the Netherlands). On the contrary, in Italy and Spain, where 
sectoral collective bargaining predominates, lack of trust is the less important aspect to 
achieve coordination. This is probably explained by the long record of participation in 
collective bargaining of those surveyed. 
As we could expect, in those countries where company level bargaining prevails, pattern 
setters are other companies. However, whilst in the Dutch case there is a reduced number 
of large multinationals considered pattern setters for the other companies, it is more 
fragmented in the case of Ireland, with up to nine companies labelled as influential by 
those surveyed. By contrast, in the countries with sectoral bargaining, no firm has been 
mentioned as pattern setter. In the case of Italy, the manufacturing sector is regarded a 
main pattern setter for sectoral collective bargaining in the pharma industry, whilst in the 
case of Spain, the interviews reveal how the chemical-pharma collective bargaining is 
actually considered a pattern setter in other sectors, therefore explaining why no sector 
has been pointed out as pattern setter. 
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Contact Networks in the Pharma Industry 
 
The differences in network size, response rate and low number of employers present in the 
survey makes it difficult to compare contact networks across all countries in the pharma 
sector. As has been already reported in the country reports of Italy and Ireland, the low 
response rate, particularly among employers, is explained by the distrust and lack of 
interest on the potential benefits of SNA analysis. However, the response rate in the 
Netherlands and Spain for the pharma sector is relatively high thus allowing to compare 
contact networks in the two countries. 
 
Graph 2. Contact Networks in the Pharma Industry 
 
Column A:  
all frequencies of contact are included 
 
Column B: links ≤5 have been removed 
for better visual interpretation 
(scale from 0=never to 8=very 
frequently) 
 
Netherlands Pharma 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands Pharma 2 
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Italy pharma 
 
 
 
Ireland pharma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain pharma 
 
 
 Employer  
 Trade union 
Source: NETWIR survey 
Note: Actors have been anonymised and assigned letters randomly. 
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Table 7. General descriptors of the contact networks in the pharma sector. 
 
Italy Netherlands 1 Netherlands 2 Spain 
Density 1,000 0,990 1,000 0,846 
Degree centralization 0,000 0,011 0,000 0,169 
Weighted degree variance 0,715 0,570 0,355 0,837 
Average tie strength (total) 3,4 4,75 5,78 4,13 
Average tie strength (within employers) - 6,13 6,33 6,08 
Average tie strength (within unions) 4,000 4,64 5,95 5,04 
Average tie strength (between employers 
and unions) 
2,500 4,44 5,52 2,23 
Source: NETWIR survey 
When comparing the characteristics of contact networks in the pharma sector of the 
Netherlands and Spain, some interesting features come out (See Graph 2 and Table 7). 
First, the bargaining network of pharma in Spain is more centralized compared to the ones 
in the Netherlands. The decentralized character of collective bargaining in the Dutch case 
suggests more dispersed power in the network and high density of relations, whilst the 
sectoral pattern of negotiations in Spain is conducive to a concentration of power in few 
actors in the network whose representatives in the bargaining process are in charge of 
reaching and signing an agreement. This is consistent with a higher density of relations in 
pharma in the Netherlands compared to Spain; when power is more dispersed, influence 
and trust can only be achieved by maintaining contacts with all the actors in the network. 
In a situation of concentration of power, where organizational hierarchy is important, 
density of relations tends to be lower as trust and influence is achieved through other 
means.  
Inter-organizational coordination in Spain (approached through average tie strength 
between unions and employers in table 7) is significantly lower to the case of the 
Netherlands. By contrast, intra-organizational coordination in Spain (approached through 
average tie strength between members of the same union or employer organisation) is 
higher. This points to the importance of hierarchies in collective bargaining in Spain, where 
intra-organizational coordination plays a more important role. In the case of the 
Netherlands, intra and inter-organizational coordination seem to be equally important in 
bargaining networks.  
The analysis of some synthetic indicators of centrality in contact networks is also illustrative 
of the above differences. The results for Spain show a pattern where employers are the 
actors with the highest number of links (top degree centrality)4, whilst in the case of those 
actors who influence the flow around the system (betweenness) there are both employers 
and unions. Finally, there is closeness centrality, an indicator that shows how close a node 
is to all other nodes in the network, and also in this case, both unions and employers have 
actors with top closeness.  
                                                
4 The degree centrality measure finds nodes with the highest number of links to other nodes in the 
network. 
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In the case of the Netherlands, there is no clear prevalence of unions or employers on any 
of the abovementioned centrality indicators, as actors from both sides appear to be high 
in the scale. It is nonetheless interesting to note the lack of direct correspondence between 
centrality indicators and the most influential actors in any of the two countries, except for 
Pharma (2) in the Netherlands. Several explanations could be given to this fact. First, it 
shows that a more active and central role in the collective bargaining network does not 
necessarily means more influence. In other words, relational power (measured by centrality 
measures) acquired in the network does not necessarily translates into more capacity to 
influence outcomes. A reason for this could be the different roles of actors in the network; 
technical actors would be more active in the network in order to solve technical issues, 
whilst those actors with a political profile would only participate in the final stages of the 
bargaining process in order to sign the agreement and would accordingly score low in 
centrality measures.  
 
Graph 3. Communities (subgroups) in the contact networks of Pharma. 
Netherlands Pharma 1 Netherlands Pharma 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain pharma 
 
 
 
 
Bargaining in Networks: A Comparative Analysis of Coordination in Collective Bargaining 
   
 
28 
 
Ireland pharma Italy pharma 
 
 
 
 
 Employer  
 Trade union 
Source: NETWIR survey 
Note 1: Actors have been anonymised and assigned letters randomly. 
Note 2: Subgroups within the network have been computed based on Louvain clustering with edge 
weighting 
 
The analysis of subgroups within the bargaining network for the two countries with higher 
response rate (the Netherlands and Spain) shows some interesting similarities, but also 
relevant differences. First, in both countries the strength of ties in the employer side is higher 
compared to unions. This points to more intra-organisational coordination on the employer 
side. Moreover, in the case of Spain, employers and unions form two clearly differentiated 
subgroups, though with two employers maintaining stronger contacts with unions. The 
stronger role for organisational hierarchies in a more centralised bargaining system makes 
ties within unions and employers more important. But at the same time, some key actors 
within employers will have a closer relationship with trade unions, especially in the final 
stages of negotiation of a collective agreement. A similar but reversed pattern can be 
observed in Pharma (1) in the Netherlands, where two subgroups also exist, though in this 
case two union representatives have closer relations with the employer subgroup (Graph 
3).  
 
Co-attendance networks in the Pharma industry 
 
While contact networks report information on direct, interpersonal relationships among 
actors in wage setting processes, co-attendance networks report whether every pair of 
actors are close because they attended the same type of events. Because any pair of 
actors can keep in touch outside of the wage setting events, these two data (frequency 
of contact and event co-attendance) provide different information on the network. 
Graphs 4 and 5 display sociograms for complete co-attendance networks and simplified 
co-attendance networks respectively. 
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Graph 4. Co-attendance networks from affiliation data (complete view, weighted data) 
Netherlands Pharma 1 Netherlands Pharma 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy pharma Ireland pharma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain pharma 
 
 Employer  
 Trade union 
Source: NETWIR survey 
Note 1: Actors have been anonymised and assigned letters randomly. 
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Graph 5. Co-attendance networks from affiliation data (reduced view, simplified & binary 
data) 
 
Netherlands Pharma 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands Pharma 2 
 
 
 
Italy Pharma 
 
 
 
Ireland pharma 
 
 
 
Spain pharma 
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 Trade union 
Source: NETWIR survey 
Note 1: Actors have been anonymised and assigned letters randomly. 
 
Table 8. Characteristics of Co-Attendance Networks in the Pharma Sector  
  Ireland Italy Netherlands 
1 
Netherlands 
2 
Spain 
Network Size 9 8 10 15 27 
Number of Links (weighted by 
contact frequency) 
36 28 45 105 342 
Top event attenders D G NR8 B D C K D D A H M B Z R V U 
Actors with top degree 
(weighted) 
D G E K 
L A 
NR08 B 
D NR07 
C K D D A H M B Z V U N 
Actors with top betweenness 
(weighted) 
        Z V U N 
Actors with top closeness 
(weighted) 
All All All All All 
Most influent actors 
(perceived influence) 
G H K D C E B C D C B E L R U T F 
P 
Source: NETWIR survey.  
Note: Actors have been anonymised and assigned letters randomly. 
 
The analysis of affiliation or co-attendance networks in the pharma industry confirms some 
of the results already showed for contact networks (See graph 5 and table 8). First, there is 
no clear correspondence between event attendance and influence, thus confirming the 
importance of the division of roles between political and technical actors in the network. 
Put differently, the hierarchies within the actors involved in the negotiation are clearly set 
and ex ante and the bargaining process does not significantly alter this situation. Secondly, 
there is no prevalence of either employers or unions when it comes centrality measures of 
co-attendance networks; participation in the events is similar for the two actors. 
 
The Retail Sector 
 
The retail is a strategic sector in the European economy, not only because of the size and 
employment it generates, but also because it is a good mirror for the great changes that 
are taking place in the global economy: the sector is experiencing structural changes, with 
processes of concentration and diversification, and pressures for restructuring, 
deregulation and reduction of employment. Many analysts in the last years coined the 
concept of “retail apocalypse”, namely the retail closures produced by the rise of e-
commerce (Burroni, Mori and Botalico 2020), together with other changes as outsourcing 
dynamics in the supply chain and the automation of certain processes. The retail sector 
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presents sharp differences between retailers, depending mostly on the competitive 
strategies of firms and the sub-sector within which they operate. Although the sector is 
traditionally dominated by SMEs (Table 9), large companies are increasing. 
 
Table 9. Company size of the European retail sector. 
Companies by size-class in 1000 N Share 
Micro  
(<10 employees) 
5046 93,4% 
Small 309 5,7% 
Medium 39 0,7% 
Large 7 0,1% 
Total 5401 100,0% 
Source: Eurocommerce (Source: Eurostat 2016). 
 
Furthermore, retail is an extremely important and heterogeneous sector in the EU: around 
25% of European companies are within the sector (with a 93,4% of micro enterprises) and 
around 19,3 million of workers across Europe (8,82% of the European workforce) 
(Eurocommerce 2016), just after the manufacturing sector (Eurocommerce and UNI 
europa global union 2017). The employment generated within the sector is particularly 
important in Spain (16,37%) and Ireland (13,07%) (Graph 6). Moreover, retail is a labour-
intensive sector with low wages and with a pay gap between women and men and higher 
rates of temporary contracts. 
 
Graph 6. Share of Retail workers in total employment. 
 
Source: Eurocommerce (2016), INE active labour survey (2019), Central Bank of Ireland, (2019), 
Federdistribuzione (2017) and Statline (2019). 
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Collective bargaining networks in the Retail Sector 
 
The analysis of collective bargaining in the retail sector in the four countries studied in the 
NETWIR project reveals the prevalence of multi-employer bargaining in all countries, 
except Ireland. Another characteristic common to all countries is a higher fragmentation 
in interest representation, both in the union and the employer, compared to the pharma 
industry. 
Ireland is the only country where there is no form of multi-employer bargaining nor 
coordination. The lack of organisational capacity and power resources among the key 
unions has resulted in an absence of coordinated strategy in pay bargaining and 
engagement with employers. Unions have generally poor and somewhat conflictual 
relations with employers and rely to a significant extent on social movement and 
campaigning tactics rather than the type of cohesive, centrally-devised wage strategy 
and implementation as in the case of SIPTU in Pharmaceuticals above. It is therefore 
difficult to mobilise responsiveness and to identify the operation of any coherent network 
and coordination between actors. Absent union coordination, there is little if any 
coordination to speak of. Fundamentally, there is a deeply fragmented and atomised 
structure to negotiations in the sector. Employers in Retail in many cases have conflictual 
relations with the unions and are often based primarily in the United Kingdom, limiting the 
scope for organisation and inter-employer communication further. In the other countries 
included in the research, sectoral coordination of collective bargaining exists, though with 
differences in the mechanisms underpinning coordination and the forms and degree of 
social partners fragmentation.  
In Italy, fragmentation is particularly important on the employer side. Even though there is 
one sectoral level collective agreement signed including the largest trade unions and 
employers in the sector, this fragmentation has led to the appearance of so-called pirate 
agreements 5 . As a mechanism to fight against these strategies, trade unions have 
developed strong intra-organisational forms of coordination. There is coincidence among 
the actors surveyed around the importance of other collective agreements on wage-
setting practices in the retail sector. More specifically, they agree in pointing out to the 
Tourism and Hospitality sector as a particularly important reference for collective 
bargaining in retail.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 These are agreements signed by small, usually non-representative trade unions and employer 
associations. Specifically, these agreements negotiate downwards and erode working conditions 
with the aim of undermining working standards set in existing collective agreements at company or 
sector level. As such, pirate collective agreements are an instrument for social dumping in collective 
bargaining. 
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Table 10. Relevance of challenges for coordinating in the Retail Sector (Scale of five, 
1=Irrelevant, 5= Extremely relevant). 
 
Lack of 
trust 
Power 
differences 
Fragmentation in the 
representation of 
workers or firms 
Obstacles from 
economic and/or 
sectorial context 
Ireland 3,44 3,22 2,56 4,22 
Italy 2,38 2,63 3,13 3,63 
Netherlands 3,00 2,93 3,18 2,39 
Spain 2,50 2,70 2,75 4,14 
Total 2,79 2,85 2,93 3,42 
Source: NETWIR survey 
 
In the Netherlands there are two sectoral level collective agreements in the supermarket 
sector: the VGL collective agreement for the big players in the field and the Supermarkets 
collective agreement for small and medium enterprises (i.e. all others). Both collective 
agreements are negotiated at the same table and they are identical except for pension 
schemes and early pension arrangements. The supermarket agreement is legally 
extended to the sector. Because the negotiation process takes place at the sectoral level, 
the predominant form of wage-setting in the activity is the sectoral level. However, in the 
collective bargaining process, actors surveyed have pointed out to a number of retail 
companies as particularly important in setting a pattern for negotiations.  
Finally, collective bargaining in the retail trade sector in Spain is also dualized along 
company size. Whilst large retailers have their own sectoral collective agreement at 
national level, small retailers and other activities within the retail trade sector develop 
collective bargaining at several levels. Thus, the Spanish retail trade sector is characterized 
by a high number of sectoral agreements, signed for each subsector and changing in 
relation to the territorial coverage national, regional or provincial. The analysis has been 
carried out for the large retail sector. 
Fragmentation of interest representation and sectoral characteristics (together with other 
sectoral characteristics like higher company size, high skills and productivity levels etc.) 
contribute to explain the more conflictual relations that characterise the retail sector 
compared to Pharma. The results show for all countries, except the Netherlands, the main 
challenge for coordination between unions and employers is the sectoral context together 
with the fragmentation of interest representation (See Table 10).  
 
Contact Networks in the Retail Sector 
 
The differences in network size, response rate and low number of employers present in the 
survey makes it difficult to compare contact networks across all countries in the retail 
sector. As has been already reported in the country reports of Ireland, no answers to the 
survey have been obtained from either employers or trade unions in the retail sector. 
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Moreover, similarly to what has been mentioned in the case of Pharma, there is a lower 
response rate in the case of employers. However, as the response rate for those with higher 
perceived influence in the network is 60% in the Netherlands, 83% in Italy and 89% in Spain, 
a comparative analysis of the three cases has been made. 
 
Graph 7. Contact Networks in the Retail Sector 
 
Column A:  
all frequencies of contact are 
included 
 
Column B: links ≤5 have been removed 
for better visual interpretation 
(scale from 0=never to 8=very 
frequently) 
 
Netherlands retail  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy retail  
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Spain retail 
 
 
 Employer  
 Trade union 
 Independent chair 
Source: NETWIR survey 
Note 1: Actors have been anonymised and assigned letters randomly. 
 
The analysis of contact networks in the three countries where network data is available 
shows very different patterns. Spain emerges as the case where employers are less 
represented in the network. This is explained to some extent by the monopoly of employer 
representation in Spain compared to the fragmentation existing in the other countries, 
being Italy a case in point (see graph 7). As a matter of fact, in Italy and the Netherlands, 
average tie strength within employers is lower compared to unions (see table 11).  
Trade unions are the actors with higher centrality scores in the bargaining networks of the 
Netherlands and Italy. In the Dutch case, it is also clear how within trade unions there are 
some actors that act as bridges with employers, and those are precisely the nodes with 
the highest betweenness centrality score. A similar pattern can be observed in the case of 
Italy, though with a lower density of relations. The shape of the two networks reflects 
different, but important role for trade unions as coordinators of collective bargaining in this 
sector; in the Dutch case, those trade unions with the highest centrality score, bridge the 
relationship between employers and other less important trade union. In the Italian case, 
those trade union actors which are more central actually connect and serve as shortcuts 
to link with employers in the network. That explains why those actors with the highest 
centrality score are also those with the higher betweenness, showing those actors who 
have more influence on flows in the network.  
A different pattern can be observed in the Spanish case due to the predominantly union-
based network. As has been pointed in the NETWIR Country Report for Spain, after many 
years of conflictual relations in the union side, for the first a time a collective agreement 
bringing together all trade unions represented in the sector was possible. The interviews 
revealed a particularly important role for intra-union coordination and trust building, 
something that was achieved through a) a high density of relations and, b) 
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notwithstanding differences on union size, avoiding any hierarchy on the union side and 
attaching all trade unions the same role in negotiations.  
 
Table 11. General descriptors of the contact networks in the retail sector. 
 
Italy Netherlands Spain 
Density 0,727 0,910 1,000 
Degree centralization 0,333 0,106 0,000 
Weighted degree variance 1,231 1,447 1,039 
Average tie strength (total) 3,970 4,940 6,250 
Average tie strength (within employers) 2,730 6,330 - 
Average tie strength (within unions) 6,000 6,560 5,930 
Average tie strength (between employers 
and unions) 
3,830 3,410 7,380 
Source: NETWIR survey 
The differences in networks are confirmed by the synthetic indicators showed in table 11. 
The contact network in Spain has a density of 1, meaning that every actor is tied to each 
other, whilst it is lower for the case of Italy and to a lesser extent in the Netherlands. At the 
same time, a high density mirrors into a low degree of centralization of the bargaining 
network; it reaches 0 in the case of Spain, meaning that all actors have the same centrality 
(importance / role) in the network, and is higher in the case of Italy. 
Intra and inter-organizational dynamics are different across the four countries compared. 
As previously pointed out, in all retail bargaining networks, unions play a key role, though 
in different ways. Because of this, average tie strength within unions is very high in the three 
countries. On the employer side, this indicator is also high in the Netherlands, but very low 
in Italy. This is consistent with the evidence presented in the NETWIR Italian Country Report, 
where it is showed a high degree of fragmentation on the employer side, which would 
result in low intra-organizational coordination for employers.  
When it comes to inter-organizational coordination, the above analysis suggests a more 
important role in Spain which is confirmed by the high average tie strength indicator 
between unions and employers, two times higher than Italy and the Netherlands.  
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Graph 8: Communities (subgroups) in the contact network 
Netherlands retail 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy retail
 
Spain retail 
 
 
 Employer  
 Trade union 
 Independent chair 
Source: NETWIR survey 
Note 1: Actors have been anonymised and assigned letters randomly. 
Note 2: Subgroups within the network have been computed based on Louvain clustering with edge 
weighting (http://visone.info/wiki/index.php/Louvain_Clustering) 
 
Cross-country differences in the role of inter and intra-organizational coordination can also 
be visualized in the communities or sub-groups computed in the contact networks of the 
three countries (see Graph 8). The sociogram for Italy shows the fragmentation that 
characterises interest representation in the retail sector, with three subgroups: one 
composed of employers and two with trade unions and employers with some distance 
between them. In the Dutch case, a trade union and an employer (though with some 
unions) subgroup have been identified, but compared to Italy, the gap between the two 
is narrower thus suggesting a less fragmentation. Finally, results in Spain are line with findings 
coming from qualitative analysis and reported in the NETWIR country report for Spain 
(Molina and Godino 2020). There it was clear a division on the trade union side between 
the largest and most representatives trade unions in the sector and the others. The two 
subgroups thus reflect this division in the bargaining network.  
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Co-attendance networks in the Retail Sector 
 
Co-attendance networks provide information about event attendance therefore 
providing complementary information to contact networks. Graph 9 contains sociograms 
for complete and simplified co-attendance networks in the three countries where survey 
data has been collected. 
 
Graph 9. Co-attendance networks from affiliation data. Complete view (weighted data) 
and reduced view (simplified & binary data) 
Netherlands retail (Complete, 
weighted) 
 
Netherlands retail (Simplified) 
 
 
Italy retail (Complete, weighted) 
 
Italy retail (Simplified) 
 
 
Spain retail (Complete, weighted) 
 
Spain retail (Simplified) 
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 Employer  
 Trade union 
 Independent chair 
Source: NETWIR survey 
Note 1: Actors have been anonymised and assigned letters randomly. 
 
Table 12. Characteristics of Co-Attendance Networks in the Retail Sector  
  Italy Netherlands  Spain 
Network Size 11 13 9 
Number of Links (weighted by contact 
frequency) 
55 78 28 
Top event attenders E I DG I C 
Actors with top degree (weighted) E B L D GEKLA I C H B 
Actors with top betweenness 
(weighted) 
      
Actors with top closeness (weighted) All All All except A 
Most influent actors (perceived 
influence) 
G A C GHK E H B I 
Source: NETWIR survey.  
Note: Actors have been anonymised and assigned letters randomly. 
 
The results for the retail sector show first of all how those with a higher centrality score in the 
co-attendance network are in all countries the top event attenders plus other actors. This 
means that attending events is a sufficient condition for being central in the network, but 
not a necessary one. Secondly, there is a lack of correspondence between perceived 
influence and top event attenders (See Graph 9 and Table 12). One possible explanation 
to this fact would be the existence of a clear division of roles between those actors with a 
more technical profile who attend most of the events in the bargaining process, and those 
with a more political role, whose involvement in the bargaining process is limited to the 
early (setting the agenda for negotiations) and final stages (signing the agreement). An 
alternative explanation would suggest the importance of non-formal events in the 
bargaining process and the existence of parallel processes, one formal involving the 
technical issues, and one informal where those with a political role within their respective 
organizations would participate. As informal meetings / contacts are more likely to happen 
among actors with a political role, this would also explain the lack of correspondence 
between event attendance and perceived influence. 
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Section IV - An assessment of the 
comparative relational analysis of collective 
bargaining and indications for future 
research 
 
Challenges and benefits in the implementation of SNA to collective 
bargaining 
 
Rather than just summarising key findings from the comparative analysis presented in this 
report, this section is also aimed at providing an assessment of the comparative relational 
analysis using SNA tools and methods carried out in the NETWIR project. Based on this 
assessment, some recommendations on future research and the application of network 
analysis to the industrial relations field will be made. 
Using SNA methodologies and instruments poses several challenges which in some 
respects are magnified when applied to the industrial relations field. As SNA methods 
require detailed actors’ information, usually through surveys or structured interviews, 
achieving a high response rate constitutes the major challenge. This is aggravated in the 
case of collective bargaining due to the reluctance of actors to disclose information about 
themselves and relations with others in bargaining processes.  
To overcome these problems, the NETWIR project developed a mixed methodology, 
combining semi-structured interviews with key actors, documentary analysis and the 
implementation of an online survey.  
Three types of problems were reported by the actors surveyed when implementing the 
survey. The first and most important was related to the fear to disclose information about 
the bargaining process, the events attended, or the actors met during this process. This 
was particularly important among employers. The second was the length and detailed 
questions in the survey. Even though the survey was tested before being circulated to the 
actors surveyed and was expected to take less than ten minutes, some actors complained 
about the time spent in answering it. Finally, some of the actors surveyed also declined to 
answer as they did not perceive the direct benefits of using this methodology for their 
organisations.  
An important methodological lesson from the NETWIR project is the importance of using 
mixed research approaches, combining qualitative and quantitative methods. The in-
depth interviews carried out to map out the census of actors and events proved to be key 
in interpreting SNA survey-based findings. As SNA tends to deliver good descriptive 
information about bargaining networks, it is important to use qualitative information to 
make sense of them and provide analytical insights.  
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The research project focused on collective bargaining processes to negotiate a collective 
agreement. The duration of these processes varies from country to country, but they tend 
to be between 3-8 months. The project did not cover interactions beyond the negotiation 
process. This has been pointed out by some of the actors surveyed as an important aspect 
to be re-considered in future research, as a narrow focus on the bargaining process 
leading to an agreement does not allow to get the full picture of developments and the 
richness of interactions.  
 
Summary of Key findings and Indications for Future Research 
 
The objective of the NETWIR project was to implement Social Network Analysis methods 
and theoretical tools to the analysis of collective bargaining. It started from the premise 
that the adoption of relational lenses to analyse collective bargaining processes and 
coordination was a promising avenue to enrich our knowledge about these key 
dimensions of industrial relations systems. The project thus had a strong component of 
methodological innovation and exploration, but through the comparative analysis of two 
sectors and four countries it also aimed at extracting theoretical insights and open new 
avenues for future research.  
In this way, the project has made a first important to contribution to existing research on 
industrial relations by providing first-time comparative evidence on collective bargaining 
networks using SNA methodologies. These bargaining networks have been analysed using 
standard methodologies in order to a) identify the main characteristics of the network; b) 
compute synthetic network indicators; c) compare them across countries and sectors.  
Given its strong methodological component, the project has paid particular attention to 
find the adequate way to use SNA to analyse collective bargaining processes. And the 
results must be interpreted at the light of this. The implementation of the survey among the 
actors participating in bargaining processes in the four countries and the two sectors 
selected has faced several obstacles and has delivered low response rates in some cases. 
The country reports contain a more detailed discussion and assessment of the 
implementation problems faced as well as the reasons explaining low response to the 
survey, being reluctance of some actors (especially employers) to provide information 
about relations to other actors the most important one.  
These obstacles in the implementation of the NETWIR project have served to reflect about 
the limits and potential of SNA to analyse collective bargaining. But most importantly at 
the light of the initial objectives, they have provided an opportunity to think about future 
applications of SNA to employment relations, including new areas of industrial relations 
research and ways to adapt SNA to them. 
One of the goals of the NETWIR project was to explore the diversity of interactions taking 
place within bargaining processes and networks, to understand their role in achieving 
coordination. Specific questions were included in the survey asking actors to signal the 
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existence of informal interactions and assess their importance compared to formal 
interactions. The results show an important role for informal interactions, and in some cases 
they’re considered key by actors in the bargaining network to achieve an agreement. 
There are however differences across countries / sectors. As expected, informality is more 
important role in Italy, a country whose industrial relations system is close to voluntarism. But 
even in the case of Spain and the Netherlands, with more formalised settings, actors 
perceive an important role for informality in networks.   
Another goal of the action was to allow social partners to achieve a better knowledge of 
how coordination works in their respective countries / sectors and draw some policy lessons 
about potential mechanisms to facilitate reaching an agreement. The project results have 
provided rich information in relation to the objectives. 
 
Network Centralisation, Power Concentration or Diffusion 
 
An interesting feature of networks is the extent to which power remains dispersed within 
the network, or by contrast, it is concentrated in a relatively small number of actors who 
are key in the bargaining process. Network centralisation can also complement the 
network size indicator and help to understand potential coordination problems: in large 
networks with diffused power we can expect more coordination problems compared to 
large networks where power is concentrated in two / three persons. 
One of the aspects explored with SNA is the role of relational power, i.e., the power built 
through interactions within the bargaining network. The results show that a more active 
and central role in the collective bargaining network does not necessarily means more 
influence. In other words, relational power (measured by centrality measures) acquired in 
the network does not necessarily translates into more capacity to influence outcomes. A 
reason for this could be the different roles of actors in the network; technical actors would 
be more active in the network in order to solve technical issues, whilst those actors with a 
political profile would only participate in the final stages of the bargaining process in order 
to sign the agreement and would accordingly score low in centrality measures. 
The decentralized character of collective bargaining in the Dutch case suggests more 
dispersed power in the network and high density of relations, whilst the sectoral pattern of 
negotiations in Spain is conducive to a concentration of power in few actors in the network 
whose representatives in the bargaining process are in charge of reaching and signing an 
agreement. This is consistent with a higher density of relations in pharma in the Netherlands 
compared to Spain; when power is more dispersed, influence and trust can only be 
achieved by maintaining contacts with all the actors in the network. In a situation of 
concentration of power, where organizational hierarchy is important, density of relations 
tends to be lower as trust and influence is achieved through other means. 
It is nonetheless interesting to note the lack of direct correspondence between centrality 
indicators and the most influential actors in any of the two countries, except for Pharma 
(2) in the Netherlands. Several explanations could be given to this fact. First, it shows that 
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a more active and central role in the collective bargaining network does not necessarily 
means more influence. In other words, relational power (measured by centrality measures) 
acquired in the network does not necessarily translates into more capacity to influence 
outcomes. A reason for this could be the different roles of actors in the network; technical 
actors would be more active in the network in order to solve technical issues, whilst those 
actors with a political profile would only participate in the final stages of the bargaining 
process in order to sign the agreement and would accordingly score low in centrality 
measures. 
 
Bargaining Networks’ Structures and Collective Bargaining 
 
The analysis has served to highlight different relational logics across the countries and 
sectors compared. Bargaining networks in the four countries have different characteristics 
in terms of the number of actors involved, the events, the formality / informality of 
interactions, the density of relations etc. Despite these differences, some common sectoral 
logics can be found, therefore pointing to the importance of the sectoral context. Thus, in 
the case of the retail sector, sectoral collective bargaining processes occur in all countries, 
with a more important role for intra-union coordination compared to Pharmaceuticals. By 
contrast, in the chase of Pharma the landscape is more heterogeneous as two countries 
have company-level bargaining and the two others, sectoral bargaining.  
Results also show the existence of different network configurations facilitating reaching an 
agreement. In those cases where the density of interactions is high, trust relations are more 
easily established, therefore paving the way to reaching an agreement. By contrast the 
concentration of power in some actors in the network has an ambiguous effect. In some 
cases, it is perceived as facilitating factor, particularly when this is concentrated in 
brokering actors, but in other cases may act as a hindrance to reach consensus within the 
network. 
Some lessons can be extracted from the analysis carried out.  First, the structure of 
bargaining networks has implications for the development of bargaining processes, and 
eventually, for reaching an agreement. High density of interactions and co-attendance of 
all actors in the bargaining network are related to a predominance of trust relationships 
and higher probabilities of reaching agreement.  
Second, even in highly fragmented and decentralized bargaining settings, social partners 
can resort to a number of formal and informal mechanisms to coordinate activities both 
within their organisations and between them.  
Third, whilst trust relations in the network constitute a favourable condition for reaching 
agreements, an adequate division of tasks between actors with technical and political 
roles in the process can help to speed up the process. 
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